Since the lifting of the COVID state of emergency, local governments have consistently asked whether and how they can continue to conduct remote meetings. Neither the courts nor the legislature have provided a clear answer. Last year, the Court of Appeals weighed in on an aspect of remote meetings in State of North Carolina ex rel. Cannon v. Anson County. There, the Court interpreted the county quorum statute to require physical presence for quorum purposes. Based on that holding, I inferred that an in-person quorum was required for governing board meetings.
In March of 2025, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court designated the Anson County case to be without precedential value, reopening the quorum issue for debate. Where does that leave local governments who wish to conduct meetings by virtual means? This post will focus on the legal authority for remote meetings and is the first of a multi-part series.
What does it mean when a Court of Appeals case lacks precedential value?
By order, the North Carolina Supreme Court deemed the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Anson County to be “without precedential value.” The Supreme Court has used this procedure in a number of cases throughout its history, but the practice is far from commonplace. Mole’ v. City of Durham, 384 N.C. 78, 79-71 (2023) (Dietz, J., concurring). A case without precedential value is not legally binding on trial courts or other panels of the Courts of Appeals.
The Supreme Court did not grant the plaintiff’s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, so it is unclear what motivated the Supreme Court to order the opinion to stand without precedential value. Anson County’s main holding regarding remote meetings was that remote participants do not count toward quorum for county governing boards. After the Supreme Court’s order, the quorum question—and many others—are still up in the air.
Do city councils and boards of county commissioners have the authority to hold remote meetings?
Governing boards’ authority for remote meetings remains uncertain. In North Carolina, local governments have no authority except what the General Assembly grants through charter, statute, or local act. Therefore, in order to conduct remote meetings, local governments must have a statutory grant of authority. Does one exist? During Governor- or General Assembly-declared states of emergency, the answer is a resounding “yes.” G.S. 166A-19.24 explicitly provides authority for remote meetings during these times and resolves procedural and legal questions surrounding quorum and voting. This statute trumps any locally adopted rules and any other statutory authority for remote meetings during qualifying states of emergency. Beyond those states of emergency, there is no explicit statutory authority for remote meetings. However, the open meetings law might provide at least implied authority for governing boards to conduct remote meetings.
Open Meetings Law
G.S. 143-318.13(a) provides notice and access requirements when public bodies hold official meetings via telephone or “other electronic means.” While the statute does not expressly authorize teleconference or electronic meetings, the General Assembly presumably would not specify procedures for an illegal practice. Under the statute, public bodies conducting teleconference or electronic meetings must specify a means of access (e.g., a teleconference number or video conference link) in the notice of the meeting. The notice must also specify a “location” for the public to listen to the meeting. Does that mean this section requires a physical location, such as a conference room equipped with Zoom or teleconference technology, for the public to watch or listen to the meeting? This is another unanswered question, but I believe the answer is “yes” for two reasons. First, the plain language of the statute differentiates between “location” and “means of access” and requires both. Second, the statute permits charging fees for location and equipment costs. If merely providing a teleconference number or video link was sufficient, there would not seem to be any location or equipment costs.
Governing boards may reference G.S. 143-318.13(a) to justify conducting teleconference or electronic meetings outside of a qualifying state of emergency. However, if they rely on this section for authority, they should comply with its notice and access requirements. Complying with this section means specifying the teleconference number or remote access link in the meeting notice. The meeting notice might also need to identify a physical location for the public to listen to or watch the meeting, though this requirement is open for interpretation.
Potential Issues
There are a couple of issues with relying on G.S. 143-318.13(a) as authority for remote meetings outside of a qualifying state of emergency. First, the statute does not define what it means to hold a meeting via teleconference or other electronic means, making it difficult to know what types of meetings the statute actually authorizes and when its requirements apply. Section 143-318.13(a) probably applies to any meeting that is entirely remote but what about hybrid meetings, where some members participate in person and others virtually? Is the statute triggered when even one participant is remote? Is a majority online required? Somewhere in between? While neither statute nor the courts have clarified, the emergency remote meetings statute applies when even one member of the body participates remotely (G.S. 166A-19.24(i)(3)). Since that is the only existing statutory definition of “remote meeting,” governing bodies could reasonably assume that G.S. 143-318.13(a) applies when even one member of the body attends remotely. Similarly, Robert’s Rules of Order defines “electronic meetings” as any meeting where “some or all” of the body’s members communicate with the other members via telephone or Internet. Robert’s Rules, 12th ed. 9:31 (2020). The dictionary definition of “some” includes “being at least one.” As a result, the Robert’s Rules definition also seems to imply that a meeting is remote if between one and all of the members attend remotely. Ultimately, though, there is immense uncertainty regarding the scope of this statutory authority and its related requirements.
A second, and perhaps more important, issue is that G.S. 143-318.13(a) provides no authority to count remote participants toward quorum and no authority for remote voting. Can local governing boards cure these gaps in authority through their local rules of procedure? Part 2 will address the possibilities and potential pitfalls for resolving these ambiguities on the local level.
