The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently issued a decision in State v. Barthel (N.C. Ct. App. Nov 05, 2025) that may have significant consequences for how local governments handle criticism, personal insults, and profanity in public meetings. Read on to learn more.

Facts of the Case

On January 16, 2024, Defendant William Barthel entered a special meeting of the Avery County Board of Commissioners carrying a rolled-up banner and wearing a t-shirt that read “Eat P*ssy and Protest.” As the board prepared to hold its public comment period, Barthel silently unfurled his banner and held it aloft in the back of the boardroom without obstructing anyone’s view or making any noise. The banner included a picture of County Commissioner Cindy Turbyfill and the two following phrases:

• “I’m not a gynecologist, but I know a c*nt when I see one!!” and
• “Cindy Turbyfill, Avery County’s Most Unprofessional Employee.”

(A note to readers: the profanity in Barthel’s banner was not censored, but we will be censoring the word for purposes of this post.) Soon after Barthel unfurled his banner, a law enforcement officer asked him to take the banner down due to what was written on it. Barthel refused and a second officer approached as back up. The Avery County Board Chair also directed Barthel to leave. He refused. The officers then physically removed Barthel from the boardroom. Ultimately, the officers arrested Barthel, and the State charged him with disrupting an official meeting (G.S. 143-318.17) and resisting a public officer (G.S. 14-223). A jury convicted Barthel on both charges.

On appeal, Barthel challenged his convictions on three grounds, arguing that: (1) his arrest and conviction for disrupting a public meeting violated his First Amendment rights; (2) he had the right to resist an unlawful arrest; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting a public officer. This blog post will focus solely on the First Amendment challenge to the conviction for disrupting a public meeting under G.S. 143-318.17.

The Pre-Barthel Legal Landscape

Before diving into the Court of Appeals’ analysis, let’s examine the legal context in which Barthel arose.

Disrupting Public Meetings

Under G.S. 143-318.17, anyone who intentionally disrupts, disturbs, or interrupts an official meeting is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor if they refuse to leave upon the presiding officer’s direction. The statute does not define disruption, disturbance, or interruption, and until Barthel, no North Carolina appellate case interpreted these terms in the context a G.S. 143-318.17 charge. Similarly, North Carolina appellate courts have not evaluated a First Amendment challenge to a charge of disrupting a local government board meeting until Barthel. Given the dearth of case law from North Carolina’s appellate courts, opinions on the First Amendment and public meetings issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have been instructive for local governments in moderating speech at public meetings and drafting public comment period policies.

Government Restrictions on Speech on Public Property

As we have discussed in more detail in this blog post, federal and state courts conduct a three-step analysis when evaluating First Amendment challenges to governmental speech restrictions on public property. First, a court must decide whether the speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment. Second, a court must identify the nature of the space (“forum”) where the protected speech is being restricted. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). Third, a court must assess whether the government’s restrictions on protected speech satisfy the standard of judicial review associated with that particular forum.

There are four forum categories: traditional public, designated public, limited public, and nonpublic.  The categories differ in part by the degree to which the government has opened (or not opened) the space for speech purposes. Limited public forums are created when the government takes intentional action to open a space not typically intended for public speech. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). These forums are “limited” because the government only allows specific topics or speakers—it does not invite all types of speech. In order to be constitutional, restrictions on speech in limited public forums must be (1) reasonable and (2) viewpoint neutral.  Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010).

What does it mean for a restriction on speech to be “reasonable”? Supreme Court precedent has not construed reasonableness as a particularly high bar. A government’s restriction of speech “…need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation…,” in limited public forums. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)(emphasis added). Reasonableness is evaluated “…in light of the purpose of the forum.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. To demonstrate reasonableness, agencies should be able to articulate a “sensible basis” for a restriction on speech that relates to some legitimate government objective.  Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 16 (2018).

And what does it mean for a restriction on speech to be “viewpoint-neutral”? Viewpoint neutrality requires that the government not discriminate against speech on the basis of the perspective or opinion being expressed. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. Limiting speakers who criticize the government while permitting those who speak in the government’s favor, for example, is plainly unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. In a limited public forum, the government can categorically restrict certain types of content, but can never impose restrictions based on viewpoint (we explain the difference between content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions in this blog post).

Fourth Circuit Case Law on Speech Restrictions in Public Meetings

The Fourth Circuit has had a few occasions to consider First Amendment challenges to restrictions on speech in the context of local government board meetings. It has treated local government board meetings as limited public forums. Davison v. Rose, 19 F.4th 626 (4th Cir. 2021) (school board meeting); Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Com’n, 527 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008) (county planning commission meeting). In at least two cases, the Fourth Circuit has rejected facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to policies prohibiting “personal attacks” at local government board meetings, finding these restrictions constitutional. Davison, 19 F.4th 626; Steinburg, 527 F.3d 377.

The Fourth Circuit held these policies were reasonable, in part, because they were related to the legitimate government objective of protecting against unnecessary delay and disruption to a meeting. See Steinburg, 527 F.3d at 387 (noting that “a personal attack leads almost inevitably to a response defense or counterattack and thus to argumentation that has the real potential to disrupt the orderly conduct of the meeting.”). The Fourth Circuit also concluded that prohibitions against personal attacks in limited public forums were viewpoint neutral, because they prohibited “all personal attacks, regardless of viewpoint.” Davison, 19 F.4th at 635; see also Steinburg, 527 F.3d at 387 (“We conclude that a content-neutral policy against personal attacks is not facially unconstitutional insofar as it is adopted and employed to serve the legitimate public interest in a limited forum of decorum and order.”).

Perhaps in reliance on these precedents, leading up to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Barthel, it has been common practice in North Carolina for many local governments’ public comment period policies to prohibit personal attacks, insults, and/or profanity.

The Court of Appeals’ First Amendment Analysis in Barthel

With all of that background to set the stage, let’s turn to the court’s analysis in Barthel. The opinion focuses on whether Barthel’s conviction for disrupting an official meeting under G.S. 143-318.17 violated the First Amendment, as applied to his particular conduct. The Court of Appeals ultimately vacated this conviction, based on an analysis that we’ll walk through below.

Protected Speech

First, the court explored whether Barthel’s words might fall into one of the few categories of speech that is wholly unprotected by the First Amendment: “fighting words.” Fighting words are “personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). As the court explains, the “fighting words” exception has been substantially narrowed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years—so much so that the Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction under the fighting words doctrine in over 80 years. Moreover, the North Carolina Supreme Court has found speech to qualify as fighting words only once, in a 1997 case (In re Spivey) involving a racial slur. In light of this precedent, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the silent display of a banner with insults and the word ‘c*nt’ directed at a particular person falls well below [the fighting words] threshold.”

The court went on to describe additional reasons why Barthel’s banner was protected by the First Amendment—namely, that it criticized a public official’s job performance. The court highlighted that the “First Amendment interest in fostering speech is particularly substantial when someone critiques how an elected official has chosen to carry out her duties” (quoting State v. Taylor, 379 N.C. 589, 606 (2021)). Moreover, the court emphasized that the government “cannot require citizens to be polite when criticizing their representatives,” noting that “[t]he First Amendment draws no distinction between refined political discourse and coarse personal attacks on elected officials.”

Public Forum Analysis

Determining that Barthel’s speech was protected by the First Amendment, the court moved on to analyzing whether the restriction on Barthel’s speech was nonetheless constitutional considering the forum where it occurred. The court concluded that the Avery County Board of Commissioners created a limited public forum with its public comment period during board meetings.  The public comment period was a limited (rather than designated) public forum because members of the public could only address “any agenda item under consideration by the [B]oard” and the comment period existed to “allow[] members of the public the opportunity to offer comments and suggestions for the efficient and effective administration of government.” (For more on the distinction between limited and designated public forums and why it matters for local governments, see this blog post).

The court then concluded that the speech on Barthel’s banner fell within the Board of Commissioners’ own content boundaries for the public comment period, finding that the banner “commented on the ‘efficient and effective administration of government’ by critiquing the commissioner’s alleged ‘unprofessional’ performance.”

Both here and throughout its analysis, the court seems to have viewed the two separate phrases on Barthel’s banner as being integrally connected and indivisible. Standing alone, the phrase “I’m not a gynecologist, but I know a c*nt when I see one!” does not seem to be a comment on “the efficient and effective administration of government,” nor was it related to an agenda item under consideration by the Board. In other words, it’s unclear how the court’s analysis might have changed if Barthel’s banner only contained that first sentence in isolation, given that it does not seem to fall within the Board’s own established content boundaries for the limited public forum. However, the court appears to characterize the “c*nt” sentence as part and parcel of the second sentiment expressed on the banner: “Cindy Turbyfill, Avery County’s Most Unprofessional Employee.”

Applying the Test for a Limited Public Forum

As described above, in a limited public forum, governmental restrictions on speech do not violate the First Amendment if they are (1) viewpoint-neutral, and (2) reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum. The Court of Appeals applied each part of this test to the restriction on Barthel’s speech.

Was the restriction viewpoint-neutral?

As the Court noted, viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government “targets particular perspectives on a topic—barring criticism while allowing praise, or vice versa.” In Barthel, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the restriction “targeted Defendant’s perspective, not the subject matter,” the restriction constituted viewpoint discrimination. In the words of the court:

By restricting only “inappropriate and offensive language to deploy personal insults” about commissioners, the State reveals that [Captain] Watson’s actions turned on the “particular views taken by a speaker on a subject,” not the subject itself. Defendant’s banner assessed a commissioner’s professionalism—which is commentary on the “efficient and effective administration of government” that the forum was designed to accommodate. The State would allow positive assessments of a commissioner’s performance but forbids negative ones expressed in crude terms. This distinction—allowing praise while barring criticism in crude terms—is impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Slip Op. p. 23 (quotation cleaned up for clarity). Again, the court seemed to view the two statements featured on Barthel’s banner as being inseparably linked. If taken in isolation, only the second sentence on the banner truly assessed the commissioner’s professionalism or performance. The Court of Appeals, however, appears to conclude that the banner as a whole was a negative assessment of a public official’s performance—and therefore, that using it as a basis for removing Barthel from the meeting was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  

Local governments should pay careful attention to the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the viewpoint-discrimination issue in Barthel. The court’s language indicates that a restriction on personal insults or offensive language directed towards a public official may be impermissible viewpoint-discrimination, and therefore unconstitutional. This differs from the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Steinburg and Davison, where local government policies restricting “personal attacks” in public meetings (limited public forums) were upheld as viewpoint-neutral and constitutional. It’s important to note that the Court of Appeals is not bound by federal case law from the Fourth Circuit with respect to federal constitutional questions. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 254 N.C. App. 765, 774 (2017); Ellison v. Alexander, 207 N.C. App. 401, 405 (2010). However, local governments who may face First Amendment lawsuits in both federal and state courts will need to understand how the analysis in Barthel differs from Fourth Circuit precedent.

The Fourth Circuit case law on free speech in public forums draws a distinction between:

• broadly targeting all criticism or negative feedback about public officials (a viewpoint-based, unconstitutional prohibition—see Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019)), versus
• banning only targeted insults and personal attacks against individuals (a viewpoint-neutral, constitutional restriction, according to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Steinburg and Davison v. Rose).

The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Barthel, however, does not tease apart a distinction between these two types of restrictions. This may be because the Court of Appeals was analyzing the speech on Barthel’s banner, in its totality, as the basis for his charge of disrupting a meeting, rather than examining whether a restriction on either sentence of the banner (standing alone) could pass constitutional muster. In other words, it is unclear how the Court of Appeals may have decided this case if Barthel’s banner only said “I’m not a gynecologist, but I know a c*nt when I see one!!” without any reference to Commissioner Turbyfill’s professionalism.

Was the restriction reasonable?

We have written more about the “reasonableness” standard for limited public forums here. In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that even if the restriction on Barthel’s speech had been viewpoint-neutral, it would have still failed the reasonableness test. The court determined that while “[m]aintaining meeting decorum represents a legitimate government interest,” removing Barthel from the meeting “served no legitimate purpose of facilitating orderly public comment” and instead was merely “censoring speech the officials found offensive.” According to the court, invoking G.S. 143-318.17 to remove an individual from a meeting where no actual interruption, disturbance, or disruption had yet occurred “exceed[ed] the constitutional bounds of reasonable regulation.”

The Court of Appeals also rejected the State’s argument that public officials can remove speakers based on the use of “inappropriate and offensive language to deploy personal insults,” reasoning that this approach “grants officials unlimited discretion to silence speech.” To quote the court’s opinion, “If officials can remove speakers based solely on offensive language or ‘personal insults’—even when any disturbance results from the official’s intervention rather than the speech itself—then the government can suppress unpopular speech according to speculative concerns.” Such a restriction is “precisely the kind of discrimination the First Amendment forbids,” the court concluded.

Practical Takeaways for Local Governments

1. Standing peacefully at the back of a meeting room does not disrupt a meeting under G.S. 143-318.17.  Barthel’s conduct did not obstruct other attendees’ views, make noise, or otherwise hinder the meeting’s progress. The text on his banner alone was insufficient to cause a disruption under the statute.
2. Prophylactic intervention against potential disruption is suspect. The law enforcement officers in Barthel believed Barthel’s banner was likely to provoke a disruptive response, so they acted in anticipation of that disturbance by asking him to take the banner down. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the officers’ preemptive response interrupted the meeting more than Barthel’s banner itself. Even if local governments believe speech in a meeting is likely to provoke a disruptive response, Barthel seems to suggest that they should wait for that disruption to actually materialize before intervening.
3. Local governments may want to reassess prohibitions on personal attacks and insults in public comment periods. The Barthel case indicates that restricting personal attacks and insults could amount to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The court’s focus was on the basis for the G.S. 143-318.17 charge, not on the Board of Commissioners’ public comment policy itself, so it is possible that a carefully crafted policy against personal attacks might still pass muster. However, taking that approach may need to be reevaluated in light of Barthel.
4. The place and manner of speech are important. The Court of Appeals emphasized repeatedly throughout its opinion that Barthel was not causing a disruption because of the place and manner of his speech—he was standing silently in the back of the room and holding his banner in a way that did not obstruct anyone’s view. What if, instead, Barthel had been repeatedly shouting “c*nt” into the microphone at a commissioner, fellow member of the public, or employee? What if he was holding his banner at the front of the meeting room in a way that obstructed the public’s view of the commissioners? It is possible that a charge under G.S. 143-318.17 might have been upheld under different facts indicating that the nature of Barthel’s conduct—rather than the content of his speech—was actually causing an interruption, disturbance, or disruption.
5. Results might differ between federal and state courts. The Fourth Circuit has upheld restrictions against personal attacks in the local government meeting context. Federal courts bound by that precedent may uphold policies and practices that Barthel may compel state courts to hold unconstitutional. For example, imagine a county that prohibits targeted personal attacks in its public comment period rules for governing board meetings. Two citizens step up to the microphone during a public comment period and each one uses personal insults directed at different county commissioners and county employees. Citizen #1 is asked to leave, refuses to do so, and is charged with trespass. If Citizen #1 is convicted in state court and challenges his conviction on appeal on First Amendment grounds to the Court of Appeals, then the conviction might be vacated based on the reasoning in Barthel. Citizen #2, on the other hand, simply walks out of the meeting after being told to leave, and then files a Section 1983 lawsuit in federal court claiming his First Amendment rights were violated by the Board’s public comment rules. In federal court, based on Fourth Circuit precedent, those rules would likely be upheld as constitutional (at least on a facial challenge) and Citizen #2’s lawsuit would fail.