The questions of whether and how a governing board may discipline its members are not novel. Yet, as of 2025 and 2026, local governing boards across the state are increasingly seeking ways to hold their members accountable for alleged misconduct, in and out of office. A few illustrations follow. The Hope Mills Board of Commissioners initiated a personnel investigation and adopted a resolution of censure against one of its members who had been accused of making “racially discriminatory comments.” After surveillance cameras captured the mayor in “town hall after midnight with a woman and later walking through the building in a state of partial undress,” the Board of Commissioners in Mooresville voted “no confidence” in the mayor and formally requested he resign. In Creedmoor, the Board of Commissioners voted to initiate an amotion proceeding to remove the mayor from office, following a criminal charge against him for driving while impaired. As another intermediate step, the commissioners also stripped the mayor’s privileges, except those powers prescribed by law, including “representing or speaking on behalf of the city, use of city e-mail, business cards, and access to City Hall outside of meetings or appointments.”
Local elected boards have implicit and inherent power to discipline their members. And a local board may have perfectly legitimate reasons to discipline a member or members. Perhaps a board member is violating the board’s code of ethics, interfering with public meetings, threatening or sexually harassing staff members, or otherwise creating conditions substantially adverse to good governance and service to the local community. The appropriateness of the disciplinary measure will depend upon the nature and severity of the member’s bad behavior. This blog post explores potential avenues for disciplining local board members and explains the legal and practical implications for each option.
Censure
Adopting a resolution of censure is perhaps the most commonly used and historically recognized accountability measure. The General Assembly defines censure as “[a]n action by a legislative body to officially reprimand an elected official for inappropriate or illegal actions committed by that official while in office. The act of censuring is an official condemnation for inappropriate or illegal actions committed by a public official while holding a position of trust.” In short, a resolution of censure amounts to a public expression of disapproval or formal reprimand of a board member’s actions, inactions, conduct, or behavior. The resolution might document the particular violations of local policy or the board’s code of ethics. It has some practical but no legal effect or consequences. In essence, it allows the board to distance itself from and publicly condemn the conduct of one or more of its members. Put bluntly, it serves as a “slap on the wrist” by the board against the member. In many circumstances, censure serves as the “first line of defense” against board member misconduct.
Censorship?
From time to time, I am asked whether a city council or board of commissioners may censor (as opposed to censure) one of its members. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the verb form of the word, censor, as “to examine in order to suppress . . . or delete anything considered objectionable.” Sometimes people confuse a governing board’s prerogative to censure one of its members, as discussed above, with the notion that a board may censor one of its members, that is to suppress or delete the speech or action of that board member. Other times, local governing boards have, in fact, attempted to censor one of their members by, for example, limiting that member’s participation in discussion during a meeting or even restricting that member’s ability to vote.
This type of censorship of a board member poses several legal concerns. First, while the government may limit its own speech, the First Amendment protects the speech of individual board members from government interference as with any private citizen. In other words, board members do not relinquish their right to freedom of speech by virtue of their office-holding. Second, such limitations and restrictions upon a board member’s ability to participate in the deliberative process violate generally accepted principles of parliamentary procedure, namely the opportunity for debate and discussion to ascertain the will of the majority and protect the rights of the minority. See G.S. 160A-71(c) (cities); 153A-41 (counties). What’s more, censorship meaningfully interferes with the results of an election by restricting a member from deliberating or voting on matters of public concern as they were elected to do. In the same way, this could pose a problem for the individual board member’s fulfillment of the oath to “faithfully discharge the duties of [the] office.” N.C. Const. art. VI, sec. 7. The State Constitution further provides that an individual is disqualified from office only if he or she is not qualified to vote in the election for that office or has been convicted of treason or a felony. Id. at sec. 8. Lastly, censoring a board member accomplishes nothing useful that censure does not. For all of these reasons, “censorship” should be avoided.
Vote of No Confidence
Instead of (or sometimes in addition to) a resolution of censure, some local governing boards elect to initiate a “vote of no confidence” against a board member. A no-confidence vote is just that—a formal vote by the board to indicate that they do not support a specific member, perhaps due to unfitness, broken trust, or inadequate performance. In this way and in weight, a vote of no confidence is similar to a censure. Like the resolution of censure, there are no legal consequences following a vote of no confidence.
The practical consequences of a no-confidence vote are not so obvious. The no-confidence vote originated in British Parliament, where members of Parliament could vote to decide whether they wanted the government or Prime Minister and Cabinet in power to continue. A successful vote of no confidence could then trigger a general election and ultimately see a new Prime Minister appointed. A no-confidence vote in the context of local governing boards in North Carolina, on the other hand, precipitates nothing else. The vote itself is the end. While certainly not prohibited by law or practice, the no-confidence vote’s genesis in British government could cause confusion amongst board membership as well as the public with regard to its intended purpose or effect(s). Because of this, a resolution of censure may be preferrable.
Stripping Privileges and Responsibilities
Beyond public reprimand via censure or a vote of no confidence, there may be some instances in which stripping a member of certain privileges or responsibilities is advisable or even necessary. For example, imagine a town council member who has been accused of sexually harassing or threatening town employees. As an employer, the town has a duty to provide a safe work environment, free from harassment or violence. In that case, the council could consider measures like restricting the councilmember’s access to town hall, other government buildings, or, depending on the nature of the behavior, even e-mail or phone communication systems. If the alleged misconduct is severe enough, the council could even arrange a police escort to accompany the councilmember to and from the board meeting room, for example. Less extreme measures might make sense where the misbehaving board member’s conduct is not quite so problematic or detrimental to public business. A board might remove a member from committee assignments or prohibit their attendance at non-essential town functions. It is paramount, however, that none of these measures interfere with or restrict powers assigned to the office by statute or local charter (unless so amended).
Amotion
Aside from G.S. 14-230, which directs the removal of an elected official by court order for willful failure to discharge one’s official duties, no North Carolina statute authorizes the removal of a local governing board member by the board. And the general law does not provide for recall elections for elected officials either. (Approximately two dozen cities have been granted recall authority via local act of the General Assembly.) In fact, no statute authorizes or prescribes disciplinary actions available to boards against members that misbehave, including those this post discusses.
Amotion, however, is a common law procedure by which a governing board may remove one of its members. (Common law just means law developed by judges through judicial decisions rather than statutes enacted by legislative bodies.) Amotion is an extraordinary measure to be reserved for the most exceptional circumstances. The procedure has been used by boards only a few times this century. There is a heightened standard in the removal proceeding because of the need to “balance between the extraordinary concept of overturning the results of an election and a set of facts which can also be extraordinary in its presentation of how an elected official has acted or failed to act so as to hamper the functioning of the office to which he or she was elected or create safety, security, or liability concerns arising from his or her action or inaction in office.” Berger v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 13 CVS 1942 (N.C. Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 2013) (emphases added). Amotion is appropriate where the board member’s conduct is so severe as to “challenge the integrity of the governmental process.” Id. And critically, the evidence and ultimate finding of cause for removal must be sufficiently tied to the duties of the elected office. Id.
Late School of Government faculty member, Frayda Bluestein, wrote about the amotion process, detailing the requirements for due process, notice and hearing, and an impartial decisionmaker as well as the standard for removal in her blog, “Removing an Elected Official by Amotion: Judge Says It Can Be Done.” Bob Joyce has also written about the difference between the need to remove (disqualification) and desire to remove from office here: “Removing Elected Board Members from Office.”
Investigation
Sometimes allegations against a board member are especially complex or difficulty to verify. In those instances, before disciplining a member in one of the ways outlined above, some boards may choose to initiate an investigation (internal or external) to determine what happened and whether any misconduct occurred. Investigations into purported board member misconduct are not required by statute. That said, boards may have policies about when and how investigations should be initiated and conducted. As with the other disciplinary measures, authorizing an investigation would require approval from a majority of the board. This type of investigation typically includes interviews with employees and officials who have knowledge of the alleged events as well as review of relevant documentation. The process generally culminates in some kind of report with findings to the board.
While sometimes necessary, these types of investigations can be very expensive and take several months (or longer) to complete. Another consideration for conducting an investigation is that the resulting report is likely a public record subject to disclosure, except, of course, for portions that might be confidential like personnel information, sensitive public security information, communications from the board attorney regarding claims or litigation, or criminal investigation records, to name a few. G.S. 132-1(a) et seq. The local board attorney can be an especially helpful resource in this process. Where the alleged behavior rises to the level of criminal conduct, such as bribery (G.S. 14-217) or embezzlement (G.S. 14-90), a report to law enforcement or the district attorney may be proper.
Other Considerations
To protect against the need for disciplinary measures, governing boards should have clear and mutually-agreed upon standards of conduct. To that end, state law mandates that local governing boards adopt a code of ethics. G.S. 160A-86. That same law does not, though, provide any penalty for a violation of the locally-adopted code. That said, a local governing board’s code of ethics, rules of procedure, or some other board policy may prescribe such a penalty, dictate the appropriate procedures for addressing board member misconduct, or establish a hierarchy for disciplinary measures. As always, boards should follow their own policies and procedures.
Each of these measures—adopting a resolution of censure, voting no confidence, stripping privileges and responsibilities, initiating an investigation, and commencing an amotion proceeding—would require a majority vote by the board. G.S. 160A-66, 67, 75(c) (cities); 153A-34 (counties). Where the vote involves the “official conduct” of one of its members, the board should excuse that member from voting on the matter. G.S. 160A-75(a) (cities); 153A-44 (counties).
In evaluating whether to discipline a member, local governing boards would also be wise to consider the impact of the contemplated action on public trust and perception. There is a fine line between necessarily condemning board member misconduct and undermining public confidence in the board’s ability to function appropriately and efficiently. Ultimately, individual board members and the board as a whole are accountable to the residents of the local community, and it is the electorate who will have the final say at the next election.
Finally, none of these discipline measures are a tool to oust one’s political enemy. There is no substitute for talking with one another or the discipline of working together across differences, whether ideological or personal, for the good of the local community. In fact, it’s what every local governing board member swears upon taking office, to faithfully discharge the duties of the office.
