Since the lifting of the COVID state of emergency, local governments have consistently asked about conducting remote meetings. The Court of Appeals ruled on an aspect of remote meetings in State of North Carolina ex rel. Cannon v. Anson County. In March of 2025, however, the Supreme Court deemed the Anson County case to be without precedential value. Where does that leave local governments? This post will focus on the role of locally adopted rules for remote meetings and is the second of a multi-part series.
Can local governments resolve the statutory gaps in authority on the local level?
As my first post noted, G.S. 143-318.13(a) may provide authority to conduct remote meetings but leaves important questions unanswered: i) what types of remote meetings does the statute authorize?; ii) can remote participants count toward quorum?; and iii) can remote participants vote? With so much uncertainty, local governing boards may want to adopt rules of procedure to fill in those blanks. But can they?
City councils and boards of county commissioners have express authority and significant discretion in adopting rules of procedure, but there are two restrictions. G.S. 153A-41 (county commissioners); 160A-71(c)(city councils). First, local rules of procedure cannot violate state law. Second, rules must comply with generally accepted principles of parliamentary procedure. (See this bulletin and this post for a discussion of generally accepted parliamentary principles). As a result, to assess governing boards’ ability to adopt rules surrounding remote meetings, we must determine whether such rules would violate state law or generally accepted rules of parliamentary procedure.
State Law
Defining Remote Meetings
Defining “remote meeting” or “electronic meeting” in local rules of procedure probably does not violate state law. G.S. 166A-19.24(i)(3) defines “remote meeting” only in connection with qualifying states of emergency. Outside of those states of emergency, no other statutes define “remote” or “electronic” meeting for local governments, including G.S. 143-318.13(a). In other words, because no state law defines remote or electronic meetings, there is no state law to violate. It is possible—though unlikely—that charters or local acts might define remote or electronic meetings, so governing boards should also consult those sources. Absent any specific charter or local act provisions, governing boards would not violate state law by creating their own definitions in local rules of procedure.
Permitting Remote Quorum
Counting remote participants toward quorum in local rules does not obviously violate state law either. Both the county and city governing board quorum statutes require the “presence” of a majority of members of the governing board to conduct business but say nothing of physical presence. G.S. 160A-74 (cities); G.S. 153A-43 (counties). In Anson County, the Court of Appeals interpreted the county quorum statute to require physical presence, but that analysis is no longer legally binding. Since Anson County no longer has precedential value, “presence” arguably can be interpreted to include remote presence.
Reaching this conclusion may be more difficult for city councils since their voting statute does refer to physical presence, at least in the context of counting a failure to vote as an affirmative vote (the “default yes” rule). G.S. 160A-75(a). If the General Assembly contemplated physical presence in connection with voting, there is at least an inference that it contemplated physical presence for quorum as well. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 341 (2013), quoting Ridge Cmty. Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695 (1977)(“It is always assumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.”)
All in all, the county and city quorum statutes can be construed to count remote participants toward quorum, but the validity of that interpretation is debatable. If Anson County is any indication, courts may favor physical presence. Counting remote participants toward quorum does not clearly fall within governing boards’ statutory authority but does not clearly violate state law either.
Counting Remote Votes
Similarly, it is not obvious that governing boards have the authority to count remote votes, though no state law explicitly prohibits it. The board of county commissioners voting statute, G.S. 153A-44, does not mention presence at all, let alone physical presence. This omission arguably opens the door for boards of county commissioners to allow remote votes as a matter of local procedure. See e.g., Matter of Custodial Law Enforcement Agency Recordings, 287 N.C. App. 566, 573 (2023), quoting N.C. Dep’t of Correction v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201 (2009)(“…we give every word of the statute effect, presuming that the legislature carefully chose each word used.”).
The analysis for city councils is more complex. Subsection (a) of the city council voting statute, G.S. 160A-75, contains two voting rules: i) the “general voting” rule and ii) the “default yes” voting rule. As with counties, the city council general voting rule provides that members can only be excused from voting for certain purposes and does not reference presence at all. In contrast, the “default yes” rule contains a clear reference to physical presence by stating that a member who is physically present during a vote but neglects to vote should be counted as voting “yes.” This rule also applies to members who withdraw from a meeting without being excused. They are counted as voting “yes” for any votes that occur in their absence.
There are at least two possible ways to interpret the municipal voting statute with respect to remote votes. One interpretation is that the general voting rule extends to and allows remote votes, but the default yes rule is limited to in-person votes. The plain language of the statute can be read to support this interpretation. However, this interpretation would essentially dissolve the default yes rule in the remote context, and it is unlikely that was the legislature’s intent. State v. Williams, 911 S.E.2d 286, 295 (2024), quoting Romulus v. Romulus, 216 N.C. App. 28, 34 (2011) (“we will ‘normally adopt an interpretation which will avoid absurd or bizarre consequences, the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with reason and common sense and did not intend untoward results.’”). Still, interpreting the statute in this way would enable councils to permit remote voting as a matter of local procedure. A narrower reading of G.S. 160A-75(a) is that the statute only authorizes in-person votes, due to the reference to physical presence in the default yes portion of the statute. That is, because the default yes rule assumes physical presence, physical presence is required for all votes. Under this interpretation, city councils could not allow for remote votes in their local rules because doing so would violate the statute’s presumption of physical presence.
No case with precedential value has interpreted the city voting statute in the context of remote votes. City councils should consult with their attorneys to make this difficult judgment call. Ultimately, as with quorum, there is no clear state law prohibiting remote votes but no state law authorizing them either. Given that ambiguity, allowing for remote votes in locally adopted rules of procedure does not patently violate state law.
Generally Accepted Rules of Parliamentary Procedure
In addition, there are no default principles of parliamentary procedure that prohibit governing boards from adopting rules around remote meetings. In fact, parliamentary procedure principles suggest that boards can permit remote quorum, voting, and other aspects of remote meetings so long as they adopt specific rules to that effect. (See, e.g., Rule 3 in School of Government’s Suggested Rules for both cities and counties; Robert’s Rules of Order, 12th ed. 9:36 (2020)). Still, local governing boards should assess whether their existing rules already define remote or electronic meetings. For example, the School of Government’s rules do not define remote or electronic meeting, but Robert’s Rules of Order (“Robert’s”) does. Robert’s Rules of Order, 12th ed. 9:31 (2020). If governing boards following Robert’s want a different definition, they need to separately and specifically adopt one. If they do not take that action, the definition from Robert’s likely applies.
Conclusion
State law neither clearly authorizes nor clearly prohibits adopting local rules of procedure that define and authorize remote meetings, including allowing remote quorum and voting. As a result, whether to allow remote participation at any level is a difficult judgment call that governing boards should make in close consultation with their attorneys. The next post will address various approaches local governments can take in their rules if they choose to allow remote participation.
